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You cant assume all the cloud architects are idiots they have to report their task list and cost of infrastructure to someone who can give feedback on various options based on comparative resource requirements and risks. Things like RDS, Elasticache, ECR and Secrets have multi AZ integrated so not hard to do it. Not everything is worth the money. This. Thats a feature, not a bug. Control+C (once!) The nature of our business means it wasn't a big deal, but I could imagine lots of people were in the same boat. Datacenter power has all kinds of interesting failure modes. Its late when its not. I've somehow dodged region outages on AWS for years, and here's my first one. RDS, elasticache were intermittently down for us). Mostly due to being the largest region (I think?) Wait. I believe it's on AWS after its two servers broke at the same time the other day. Aurora failed to failover properly and the cluster ended up in a weird error state, requiring intervention from AWS. I was very surprised when I heard the cluster was in a non-customer-fixable state and required manual intervention. Not everything is greenfield, and re-architecting existing applications in an attempt to shoehorn it into a different deployment model seems a bit much. Most companies aren't using multiple AZs, let alone multiple regions. Now I need to architect my legacy app so that I can deploy into lambdas, then I can get resiliency I don't really need! Use something like Lambda and you get multi-az for free. This should be at most 100km. I've rarely deployed an app where it was as easy as just to change a region variable. https://github.com/patmyron/cloud/#ip-addresses-per-region. and R53 is impacted (which is supposed to be global, IIRC). So you need to create a new KMS key and update everything to use the new multiregion key. Second: EKS (Kubernetes). So many alerts firing off in unexpected ways. There's all sorts of cascading/downstream "weirdness" that can result on AWS's own services through the loss of an AZ. When the three campuses are fully developed, each will have five 150,000 SF data centers with a total power capacity of over 300 MW. According to BizJournal, Amazon Web Services has acquired a 58.5-acre land in Prince William County, Virginia, for $87.8m. All of the multi-AZ failover depends on AWS recognizing that their AZ is having an issue, and they never reported having an issue on any health-check so no failover ever happened. Availability zones are not guaranteed to have the same name across accounts (ie. Everything else is stateless and can be moved quickly. I occasionally get kudos messages in my inbox :). I don't work on cloud stuff, so I'm genuinely unsure if this is a joke. There are of course a lot of companies that aren't architected with multi-AZ at all (or choose not be be). Chaos Kong is the one that takes out whole regions. Only the external health checks that hit the system from an outside service were failing. We expect to recover the vast majority of EC2 instances within the next hour. > Looks like Snap, Crackle and Pop are down as well. a single DC in the use2-az1 availability zone. us-west-2b for you is something different than us-west-2b for everyone else. It's not just a single instance too, there's generally a lot more infrastructure (db servers, app servers, logging and monitoring backends, message queues, auth servers etc), (And checkbox-easy is sweeping edge cases and failure modes under the rug). Right, because magically serverless is the right answer for every application. Jinxed for sure. Sorry all I jinxed it. (assuming the services that are down are not the base layers of AWS, like the 2020 outage). Same here - we were finally able to log in to the console, but we're in us-east-2 and are having a ton of issues. Pedantic clarification for the unfamiliar: the breakfast cereal is named. us-east-2 is our default region for most stuff and so far that's been good. us-east-2a for my account may map to the internal use2-az1, but in your account us-east-2a may map internally to use2-az2. They do not have asafe culture and its bad for your career if there is a major outage. Being completely HA and independent of AZ crashes/bug is extremely hard and time intensive and usually not worth it compared to investing that time to get your app to run smoothly. To them it's much easier to communicate "Hey, our customer service is going to be degraded on the second saturday in october, call on monday" to their customers 1-2 month in advance, prepare to have the critical information without our system, and have agents tell people just that. And if I would have read the page the link points to better, that's exactly the reason. The AWS status board, posted elsewhere in the comments, seems to think this is an AZ outage, not a regional one. If you never had a devops role and used AWS managed services, you cant automate that and trim costs. Ya, am I surprised by this too. because all of the AWS failover functionality did not function as they should have and we were relying on that. Having everything well-architected on AWS iswell, it's a problem for reasons of monopoly and cost, but it's not a problem for availability. We can totally test the happy case to death, and if the happy case works, we're done in 2 hours for the largest systems with minimal risk. BUT, this seems like an extremely solvable problem. Thank goodness they had an enterprise support deal or who knows if theyd still have issues now. Agreed, money can't solve everything. Given the scope of the effort invested in attempting to prevent duck and goose crap on the world's docks, I'm skeptical that this tactic is effective. all of our production services are multi-az as well. ), I did notice it being a little slow but I'm also on 4G at the moment (it got the blame), And the reason that works is because HN is mostly hosted on its own stuff, without weird dependencies on anything beyond "the servers being up" and "TCP mostly working.". Its premature when its premature. You can then start a new instance in a different az but the process is semi manual. Finally, when the Kubernetes EC2 worker node came back up, nearly nothing got scheduled back to it. By your last sentence, it appears you agree with me. Going bare-metal is a premature optimization. 99.99% means around 4 minutes a month. Maybe not the entire region. Companies dont want to pay for in house architecture/etc and developers are generally ultra hostile towards ops people. Rather minor production as far as AWS outages go. Anyone having issues in 2b? You're still reliant on the AWS Lambda team to shift traffic away from a failing AZ, and until they do that, you'll see "elevated error rates" as well. Most startups that go that route don't survive long enough to make use of this optimization. Aurora can replicate the data but doesn't have to keep a hot standby AFAIUI. I think this is the first AWS downtime in last couple years that hit our systems directly. We started being able to make progress when AWS told us which AZ was having issues. https://docs.aws.amazon.com/ram/latest/userguide/working-wit https://docs.aws.amazon.com/prescriptive-guidance/latest/pat us-east-1 is the region you're thinking of that has issues. No complexity or microservices. If we all had the same number one ; then things would not be loaded anything close to evenly. If it really got stuck and you have to kill it, then sure, you might have to mess with it a bit. I interviewed there a few months ago for DevOps, and one of the people I interviewed with said that most of Zoom was in AWS (they liked that I had AWS stuff on my resume). Multi-AZ architecture just double the cost at least, and it tends to cost even much more if the business is small. Not ideal when there's no dedicated ops. [10:25 AM PDT] We can confirm that some instances within a single Availability Zone (USE2-AZ1) in the US-EAST-2 Region have experienced a loss of power. If true, I'm sure always running the latest builds was not great for stability. I did have some Kubernetes pods become unhealthy but only because they relied on making calls to servers that were in a different AZ. Those never fail, right? I can't help but bring up the point that an old-school bare-metal setup on something like Hetzner/OVH/etc becomes significantly more cost-effective since you're not using AWS's advantages in this area anyway (and as we've seen in practice, AWS is nowhere near more reliable - how many times have AWS' AZs gone down vs the bare-metal HN server which only had its single significant outage very recently? For AWS specifically, Im fairly certain they maintain a minimum distance and are much more strict on requirements to be on different grids etc than other Cloud providers. There is no "someone" who could do anything about this. ;). For most businesses a little down time here and there is a calculated risk versus more complex infrastructure. us-east-1 and us-east-2 are not the same. Hmmmmmm us-east-2 customer here also having some issues, yeah looks like us-east-2 has networking issues. Only reason we knew to shut them down at all was because AWS told us the exact AZ in their status update. I think any system is susceptible to problems like this if the underlying hardware becomes unavailable. Those stateless app servers are the easy part. My take is that so many sites are broken, maybe I shouldn't care either. - Is it worth to have 3 suppliers for every part that our business depends, with each of them being contracted to be able to supply 2x more, in case other supplier has issues? > The fact that so many popular sites/services are experiencing issues due to a single AZ failure makes me think that there is a serious shortage of good cloud architects/engineers in the industry. That's why I'm so surprised. Except that when it actually happened, turns out your system couldn't really survive a sudden 30% capacity loss like you expected, and the ASG churning is now causing havoc with the pods who did survive. If youre Amazon where every second is millions of $ in transactions you care more than StartUp that has 1 request per minute. 1) AWS is already really expensive, just on a single AZ. Multi-AZ is a requirement on production level loads if you cannot sustain prolonged downtime. I would think regions with more AZs (like us-east-1) would handle an AZ failure better since there's more AZs to spread the load across, What's more surprising, imo, is the large apps like New Relic and Zoom that you'd expect to be resilient (multi region/cloud) taking a hit. At least 1 cluster had a node on affected hardware (per AWS). Those companies are having an even worse time right now. Yeah, makes sense if explicitly stated. Edit: 2 minutes after I post this it starts working. As some others have alluded to, it seems common AWS services (the ones you rely on to manage multi-AZ traffic like ALBs and Route53) spike in error rate and nose dive in response time so it becomes difficult to fail things over. The availability zone AZ1 was the one impacted, and within that availability zone, most likely only a subset of servers. also inter region replication costs bandwidth money. Power has been restored to the affected facility and at this stage the majority of the affected EC2 instances have recovered. Whether TF can update the state & release its locks would depend on where those were hosted. But both of them have Multi-AZ options. Aren't multi-az deployments more expensive? or datacenter failure is considered such a rare event that's it's not worth the cost/trouble of using more? And things that can fall over are inherently more complicated. 4 hours if we have to recover from nothing, also tested. They used to be extremely cagey about giving out those mappings for your account. Maybe you have a system that requires more hands on work and want to explain your point of view? Similarly, many customers run Lambdas outside of VPCs that theoretically shouldn't be tied to an AZ. If you are not chaos-monkeying regularly, you won't know about those cases until they happen. it can't do that, and manual intervention will be required afterwards. AWS makes it pretty easy to operate in multiple AZs within a region (each AZ is considered a separate datacenter but in real life each AZ is multiple datacenters that are really close to each other). This has more to do with AWS than Terraform. There are six 9s in there. We run our own infrastructure and are not built on AWS. I presume they are trying to express an extra cardinal dimension perpendicular to the plane. Usually the better datacenters have multiple levels of power redundancy including emergency backup generators. Interesting to see it's been a loss of power that caused this. Datacenters do end up completely dying now and then, you really want to have a good strategy in that case. It would be one thing if this was a Regional failure, but a single AZ failure should not have any noticeable effect. us-west-2 has had outages as well but it is less common, even rare. Interestingly enough, to them, a controlled downtime of 2-4 hours with an almost guaranteed success is preferable, compared to a more complex, probably working zero-downtime effort that might leave the system in a messed up - or not messed up - state. It seems more likely they just don't have failovers. But technical debt bites you in every new feature by slowing new code addition. AWS is notorious did underreporting and failing to report. It could be that their shared-fate scope is an entire data hall, or a set of rows, or even an entire building given that an AZ is made up of multiple datacenters. A few years ago they were calling out Azure and Google Cloud on exactly what you describe (having data centers essentially on the same street almost). AWS has announced its plans to expand its footprint in Latin America with the development of a new cloud region in Santiago, Chile. I think you may have slightly misread. This will be AWS third low-rise office property acquisition in Sterling, Virginia, in 2022. Take advantage of AWS (or Azure, or DO) until you're big enough that bringing the action in-house is a financially and technically prudent option. You'll need to see which availability zone ID (e.g., use2-az3) corresponds to each zone in your account: https://aws.amazon.com/premiumsupport/knowledge-center/vpc-m edit: AWS identified this as a power loss in a single zone, use2-az1. Couple this with the fact that management is only concerned with creating new capacity instead of fixing existing capacity. This took several hours to resolve. Wonder if this is why Zoom is down. Looks like this particular issue was due to power loss, and for power us-west-2 has one clear advantage: It's power is directly from the Columbia river and highly unlikely to have demand based outages. However, the actual underlying stack deployment succeeded. That would be a valid reason not to check this checkbox, if your business can survive a bit of downtime here and there. Looks like Snap, Crackle and Pop are down as well. Some of the services the zone offers include database, storage One of three campuses in the US East (Ohio) Region, Receive concise industry news summaries that will keep you abreast of the Data Center and Telecom markets, - 1 More Data Centers (Login to gain access) -. Today, a SaaS Im familiar with that runs ~10 Aurora clusters in us-east-2 with 2-3 nodes each (1 writer, 1-2 readers) in different AZs had prolonged issues. And you know, at that point, is it really economical to spend weeks to plan and weeks to test a zero downtime upgrade that's hard to test, because of load on the cluster? Nail on the head. I dunno how else to put it. Yeah, let's place everything in large colos instead. And pay a big premium for that? It's a game theory thing. At least in eu-north-1 the three AZs are located in different towns, about 50 km apart (Vsters, Eskilstuna and Katrineholm). There is some command to find out what the unique ID number is for your particular zones with your naming. Stay in us-east-1, they provide Chaos Monkey for free. My original comment was about "popular sites/services", that should be able to tolerate the costs and are most likely dealing with multiple servers. Multi-region failover would have made us more fault tolerant but our infrastructure wasn't setup for that yet (besides an RDS failover in a separate region). Because us-west-2 is fairly typical it tends to be one of the last regions to get software updates, after they've been tested in prod elsewhere. Rarely is Terraform mentioned in any other context. Looks to be a larger issue in the US East, also seeing Cloudfare and Datadog with issues. Which internal health checks are you referring to? Sometimes, I'm perfectly fine with eventual consistency. Shrug the datacenter is land locked (different animal species) and the problem hasn't happened again in multiple years. Each Availability Zone can be multiple data centers.At full scale, it can contain hundreds of thousands of servers. - it makes sense considering the AWS control plane is orders of magnitude more complex than an old-school bare-metal server which just needs power and a network port). If you had "done the math" then you would have gone serverless and gained multi-az for free, as it is almost always the cheapest option. Just my hunch given that it happened during the middle of the week in the middle of the day, and came back relatively quickly. If either of those failed the server would have been removed from the load balancer, but they didn't fail. This explains it. I don't know why I previously thought their EC2 uptime claims were sufficient. I had to manually re-deploy to get pod distribution even again. The mapping from AZ Name (account-specific) to AZ ID (global) shows up on the EC2 overview page in the dashboard. and like you mentioned, the oldest. All that to say that its never straightforward. I find this spreadsheet handy for thinking about AWS region-wide outages and frequency. Replicating to a second AZ would almost double your costs. As for legacy applications, I would not have brought up them up at all if you hadn't suggested pushing things into lambdas as a solution to multi-az. But "site sometimes goes down" can be often a very valid option. Complex systems often fail in non-trivial ways. I don't appreciate the snarky responses tho. The issue is, the services were still reachable via internal health checks. Unless I'm misunderstanding what you meant. Clarification: 1/3 of sites will go down (those using the AZ that went offline), but my point is the same. We had an outage and we have a very complete architecture. I'm personally not confident at all in Amazon's (or frankly, any public cloud provider's) ability to actually guarantee seamless failover during an outage, since the only way to prove it's working is to have a real outage as to induce any potential second-order effects such as inter-AZ links suddenly becoming saturated, which AWS or any other cloud provider aren't going to do (as an intentional, regularly-scheduled outage for testing would hurt anyone who intentionally doesn't use multiple AZs, essentially pricing them out of the market by forcing them to either commit to the cost increase of multi-AZ or move to a provider who doesn't do scheduled outages for testing purposes). The bigger companies with overhead reservations will get all the instances before you can launch any on demand during an AZ failure. don't all the multi-AZ deployments imply at least 1 standby replica in a different AZ? I believe us-east-1 runs some of the control plane and an us-east outage can effectively take a service in a different region offline as it can break IAM authentication. So my us-east-1 zone A might be your B. Not sure why we're on that list. Dont make the mistake of overromanticizing the simple solutions. Which is normally not needed. Some systems are A-OK with downtime. I forget if you can make those objects regional when stored in AWS or not. It required pushing a dummy change to unblock that pipeline. > us-east-1 is the region you're thinking of that has issues. Kubernetes did a decent job at re-scheduling pods, but there were edge cases for sure. If you're using any managed services by AWS, you need to rely on their own services to be AZ fault-tolerant. Mainly with Consul and Traefik running inside of the Kubernetes cluster. Wasn't able to connect just now. They call their data centers availability zones. Are you saying that while AWS maintains multiple AZs they cant maintain reliability on the failover systems between them? I just set up a few small sites (not live yet) on us-east-2, because us-east-1 has a poor reputation. Not everyone can afford it. It's a joke but I only knew that because Snap is/was (as of S1) hosted on GCP and not AWS. Nothing on, Anyone's ECR endpoints went out during the outage? Can confirm based on what Metrist is seeing. The AZ isolation guarantees are not quite at the maturity they need to be. Multi-AZ seems like a bare minimum for basic reliability. Installed a fake Eagle after that. On top of that, I was looking at the documentation for KMS keys yesterday, and a KMS key can be multiregion, but if you don't create it as multiregion from the start, you can't update the multiregion attribute. We've had timeouts while pulling images onto our k8s cluster post-restart. Even if they did care, the business is often too incompetent to understand that they could easily prevent these things. Living a bit more dangerously at the moment as HN is still running temporarily on AWS. possibly related: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=32267154, Now I guess we have to move to us-west-2. Lots of issues in us-east-2 for instances for us but also other regions when connecting to RDS. Both RDS and elasticache run on EC2. Haha literally had this same thought. unfortunately one of the largest regions: I'm seeing issues in 2a but not 2b. Want GKE to run multi-zone, or Spanner to run multi-region, just check a box (and insert coin). Depending on the size of the company it can be simple or hard. The only time that outages make the news is when they all fail in a region. Interestingly, we saw a bunch of other services degrade (Zoom, Zendesk, Datadog) before AWS services themselves degrade. If everyone stays single AZ, everyone goes down at the same time so nobody gets blamed. It's just that I am one of those people who have tried to solve the duck/goose problem and would be delighted if a fake eagle or owl worked. I.e., devops roles look like surplus in the system if theyre doing a worse job than managed services but to certain audiences, that surplus is necessary. It is more complicated, and it does require a different sort of person. That said it's not a panacea. Now Im unsure. It was because apparently Netlify and Auth0 use AWS and went down, which took down our static sites and our authentication. Example - we have a service that used Kafka in the affected region that went down. A lot of money to be made there if things are so trivial for you. "[10:11 AM PDT] We are investigating network connectivity issues for some instances and increased error rates and latencies for the EC2 APIs within the US-EAST-2 Region.". When you start playing the HA game, the easy failures go off the table, and things break less often because failures happen constantly and are auto-healed. And I think Alexa skills, if anybody cares about those. Funny I failed away from the zone and RDS still doesn't work, connections fail. :). [1] https://aws.amazon.com/premiumsupport/knowledge-center/rds-f Someone didn't check that box because they didn't know about it, there isn't much complexity in it. Good thing we don't have EVERYTHING on AWS, so no threat detected. Pretty solid! This isn't good, and someone who can do something about it needs to. Insert clip of O'Brien explaining to cardassians why there are backups for backups, In case anyone is unaware of the reference, thats taken from Star Trek Deep Space 9. https://docs.aws.amazon.com/lambda/latest/dg/security-resili Dynamo is another service that wouldn't be impacted as it is multi-az. I'm running Terraform and it appears to be stuck now. But https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=32267154, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RuJNUXT2a9U. Getting postgres RDS multi-region would require the extra couple of lines in your CDK, but is fairly straightforward. Perhaps we should have some backup servers on the moon, then in case of nuclear warfare we can still be online via satellite. This has really started to change my thoughts of how to approach, e.g. This seems to be the first major us-east-2 outage, indeed, vs us-east-1 and other regions. I think companies simply put reliability on the back burner because it rarely bites them. In all seriousness, we've been deploying everything on us-west-2, and it seems to have dodged most of the outages recently. Good engineers find the balance between the cost and the availability. I've been pushing companies to make their initial deployments onto us-west-2 for over ten years now. However, in my experience, the people doing the calculations on that risk have no incentive to cover it. The amount of times I've seen way overcomplicated redundancy setups which fail in weird and wonderful ways, causing way more downtime than just a simplier setup is pretty silly. But because the servers generally still appeared healthy, this can effect some well architected apps also. Are you sure you understand their uptime claims? At least in my experience, AWS downtime also only accounts for a minor share of the total downtime; the major source are crashes and bugs in the application you're actually trying to host. We had to resolve it by manually shutting down all the servers in the affected AZ. Yup, exact same here. Dunno how much truth there is to it as we don't use AWS directly. Also, because shared and global AWS resource are (or at least often behave as if they are) intimately tied to us-east-1. We have always been at war with us-east-2. Spend more time on features instead. First: RDS. https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1Gcq_h760CgINKjuwj7Wu (from https://awsmaniac.com/aws-outages/), Always check HN before trying to diagnose weird issues that shouldn't be connected. What's really costly is testing their assumptions. People are just unaware, and probably making bad calls in the name of being "portable". We've just spent the last hour debugging our website, thinking we had issues. I thought we were talking about cloud architects making poor decisions when designing solutions. As an example, one of our CodePipelines failed the deployment step with an InternalError from CloudFormation. Also, a large chunk of AWS is managed from a single data center so if that one goes down you may still have issues with your service in another data center. If you can get the data out of the downed AZ, don't have state you need to transfer and are not shot in the foot once the primary replica comes online again. Because money can't fix everything? a major postgres update. AWS works with multiple availability zones (AZ) per region, some products by default deploy in several ones at the same time, while others leave it up to you. Not all systems require high availability. It's a feature. Classically, us-east-1 received most of the hate given its immense size (it used to be several times larger than any other) and status as the first large aws data center. (You can in some other storages.). And even if they did realize it, they don't want to prioritize it over pushing out another half-baked feature, making sales, getting their bonus. One of our Kubernetes EC2 worker nodes (in EKS) went down because it was in the zone with the power outage. Their bonus has no link to the uptime and they can blame $INFRA for the lost millions and still meet their targets and get promoted / crosshired. Also, people who can configure and maintain that infrastructure. Range is in 60km-100km range typically. Multi-AZ architectures are more expensive to run, but that's normally not the issue. The fact that so many popular sites/services are experiencing issues due to a single AZ failure makes me think that there is a serious shortage of good cloud architects/engineers in the industry. Could not write to the db at all. But that system breaks down here when you need to know whether you are in an affected zone. Here are some things I noticed from today's events. Zone downtime still falls under an AWS SLA so you know about how much downtime to accept and for a lot of businesses that downtime is acceptable. Im sorry about your feelings but you are wrong. Thanks, this comment made it very clear to me that I never want to touch a terraform system. I think a good trade off, if your infra is in TF, is to be able to run your scripts with a parameterized AZ/region. Zoom is having connectivity issues. we definitely had issues with all of the AZs in east-2, and far more services impacted than just EC2 (f.e.